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Carolina Power and Light Co. v. Uranex: Quasi in
Rem Jurisdiction to Secure a Potential Arbitral
Award: An Exception to Shaffer v. Heitner's
Minimum Contacts Requirement
In 1977 the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California held in Carolina Power and Ltgkt Co. v. Uranext that the Shaffr v.
Heiner2 requirement of minimum contacts for quasi in rem jurisdiction
contained an exception which permitted attachment of assets for security
purposes.3 The court determined that prejudgment attachment of a debt
due to a foreign defendant was constitutional under Shaft,4 and, signifi-
cantly, that an attachment order could be maintained pending arbitra-
tion under the provisions of the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.5 The court found no conflict
between the factors underlying a decision to arbitrate and the procedural
requirements of prejudgment attachment.6 Finally, the court addressed
the issue of ownership of accounts payable to the defendant. Applying
French law, the court held that Uranex was not the owner of the at-
tached debt and that the attachment could be maintained only in the
amount representing Uranex' commission as agent. 7
Defendant Uranex, a French groupement d'interet economique,8 con-
tracted with Carolina Power and Light Company (CP&L), a North Car-
olina public utility company, to deliver uranium concentrates to CP&L
during the years 1977 to 1986. The contract provided that all disputes
would be submitted to arbitration in New York. Subsequently, world
uranium prices rose sharply and Uranex was either unwilling or unable
to deliver at the contract price. In 1977, CP&L filed an action against
Uranex and proceeded to attach an $85 million debt owed to Uranex by
1 451 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
2 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
3 451 F. Supp. at 1048.
4 Id. at 1051.
5 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S.3. For U.S. implementing legislation, see
9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1976).
6 451 F. Supp. at 1052.
7 Id. at 1054.
8 A groupement d'interet economique is an association of economic concerns formed to perform
various functions. Such a group may represent the interests of its members in the legislative
process. In the instant case, one of Uranex' purposes was to act as an agent in making contracts
for other business entities.
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Homestake Mining Company, a corporation based in San Francisco.
The debt was due to Uranex in its role as commissionaire9 for a third party,
and had no relationship to the dispute with CP&L.
Arbitration proceedings began in New York after the lawsuit was
filed, thereby precluding the court from considering the merits of the
case. However, CP&L sought to maintain the attachment pending arbi-
tration as security for any future award.' 0 Uranex challenged the juris-
diction of the court under the standards of Shafr v. Het'ner and asserted
that, in any event, the attachment was contrary to the provisions of the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards. I" Additionally, Uranex argued that as comm'ssz'onai're in the con-
tract with Homestake, it was merely an agent with no ownership interest
in the debt. 12 Therefore, under California law, the funds could not be
attached.
Although Shafr extended the Internatonal Shoe Co. v. Washington' 3
minimum contacts requirement for in personam jurisdiction to cases
based on quasi in rem jurisdiction, the CP&L court found Shaffr con-
tained a specific exception for cases brought solely to attach assets for
security purposes.14 The court reasoned that "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice" applied to a plaintiff's interests as well as to
those of a defendant. Therefore, the policy favoring attachment to se-
cure a plaintiff's potential judgment served to reduce the quantity and
quality of contacts necessary to bring a defendant into a forum.'
5
In maintaining the attachment order, the court acted in the wake of
an academic storm precipitated by the Supreme Court's decision in Shaf-
fer. 16 Shafr was hailed as a much needed decision which rejected the
earlier theories of jurisdiction espoused in Pennoyer v. Nef' 7 Harris v.
Balk'8 and Hanson v. Denckla '9 by broadening the application of the min-
imum contacts theory first espoused in International Shoe. The plaintiff in
9 The commtsitonate acts as an agent by contracting with third parties to buy or sell goods
for the commettant or principal. The commissionaire enters the contract in his own name and is
personally bound. See 451 F. Supp. at 1053. See also R. PENNINGTON, THE FRENCH LAW OF
DISTRIBUTORSHIP AGREEMENTS (1976).
16 451 F. Supp. at 1045-46.
11 Id. at 1046, 1049.
12 Id. at 1052.
13 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
14 451 F. Supp. at 1052.
15 Id. at 1048.
16 There are many excellent law review notes interpreting the Shaffer decision. The most
helpful comments include Silberman, Shafer v. Heziner. The Endofan Era, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV. 33
(1978); Symposium." State-Court Jurisdiction afier Shaffer v. Ileiner, 63 IOWA L. REV. 991 (1978);
Vernon, State-Court Jurisdiction: A Prelimina~v Inquiy into the Impact of Shafer v. Heiner, 63 IOWA L.
REV. 997 (1978); Note, Shafr v. Hetner's Efect on Pre-Judgment Attachment Jurtrdiction Based on
Property, and New York's Seider Doctrine Have We Finally Given Up the Ghost of the Res?, 27 BUFFALO
L. REV. 323 (1978).
17 95 U.S. 714 (1877). The Supreme Court held that the state had exclusive jurisdiction
over all persons and property within its territory; its jurisdiction did not extend beyond its
borders.
18 198 U.S. 215 (1905). The Supreme Court held that state courts could acquire jurisdic-
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Shaffer, a nonresident shareholder of a Delaware corporation, brought a
shareholder's derivative suit based solely on the sequestration of stock in
the Delaware corporation owned by the defendants. The Delaware
Supreme Court held that International Shoe did not apply to the action
because it was quasi in rem and not dependent on prior contacts of the
defendant. 20 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, reconsidered the theo-
retical and policy supports of the precedent cases in light of the appel-
lants' contention that the Delaware sequestration statute as applied
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. It found a
fundamental weakness in the distinction made by the courts between ju-
risdiction over people and property. The Court stated that jurisdiction
over a thing was no more than "a customarily elliptical way of referring
to jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing.12 1 Consequently,
the Court rejected the use of property as a basis for asserting what is
essentially jurisdiction over the person. It held that henceforth "all asser-
tions of state court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the stan-
dards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny. 22
Thus, the district court in CP&L was faced with determining the
jurisdictional issue under the new requirements of Shafer. Without dis-
cussion, the court found no basis for in personam jurisdiction.23 It noted
that since Shafer set identical standards for both in personam and quasi
in rem jurisdiction, the finding of no basis for in personam jurisdiction
might be considered determinative of the entire jurisdictional issue.24
CP&L, however, contended that the Shafer opinion set out an ex-
ception when quasi in rem jurisdiction was asserted for security pur-
poses. 25  In Shafer, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that
International Shoe should not apply to quasi in rem jurisdiction because
this would allow a wrongdoer to remove assets from within the reach of
the plaintiff. However, in assessing the argument, the Court stated, "[a]t
most it suggests that a State in which property is located should have
jurisdiction to attach that property, by use of proper procedures, as se-
curity for a judgment being sought in a forum where the litigation can be
tion over a garnishee temporarily in the state and could then garnish the debt he owed plain-
tiff's out-of-state debtor.
19 357 U.S. 235 (1958). The Supreme Court held the Florida courts had no jurisdiction
over a Delaware trust company, despite the presence in Florida of the settlor and most of the
beneficiaries of the trust. The Court found the nature and purpose of the Delaware corpora-
tion's activities within Florida insufficient to permit Florida's assertion of in personam jurisdic-
tion.
20 Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225, 229 (Del. 1976).
21 433 U.S. at 207.
22 Id. at 212.
23 451 F. Supp at 1047. It could be argued that the minimum contacts standard as ap-
plied in Hanson and McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 235 (1968), would
allow in personam jurisdiction on the facts of the case.
24 Id.
25 Se Mehrer & Troutman, Jurisdiction to Adudicate." A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 1121 (1966). In suggesting new standards for quasi in rem jurisdiction based on minimum
contacts, the authors argued in favor of such an exception.
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maintained consistently with hnternational Shoe. ' 26
The district court undertook to interpret the meaning of this passage
in the context of the entire opinion. It concluded that the broad stan-
dard of "fair play and substantial justice" included "consideration of
both the jeopardy to plaintiff's ultimate recovery and the limited nature
of the jurisdiction sought."' 27 On the basis of this conclusion, the court
adopted a two-part test for the purpose of determining whether it could
constitutionally assume limited jurisdiction to attach assets pending liti-
gation in another forum. 28 The requirements under CP&L are first, that
the property be present within the state in the ordinary course of events
rather than by mere fortuity; and second, that the attaching court be a
convenient forum for the defendant to litigate the limited issues arising
from the attachment. 29 Applying its own test, the court found that since
the debt arose as a consequence of Uranex' contract with Homestake, a
California corporation, and Uranex had agreed to litigate disputes with
Homestake in California, the attachment was constitutional. 30
However, the court conditioned the attachment order on the filing
of an in personam action by CP&L in a forum with jurisdiction in com-
pliance with Marshall's dictum in Shafr.3 1 The effect of this condition is
that, in addition to the arbitral proceeding, two judicial actions must be
filed in order for the plaintiff to secure a potential arbitral award. One
action must be filed in the state where the assets to be attached are lo-
cated, and another in a forum with jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits
of the case. This requirement frustrates the purposes of arbitration; it
forces parties into court after they make a contractual commitment to
avoid entering the judicial process. Furthermore, since the courts will
ultimately enforce the agreement to arbitrate, the filing of the in per-
sonam action is an empty exercise that causes extra expense and loss of
time.
Next, the court addressed Uranex' contention that prejudgment at-
tachment pending arbitration was inconsistent with the purposes of the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards.32 However, after examining the Convention, the court con-
26 433 U.S. at 210.




31 Id. at 1049.
32 Id. The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
was adopted by the United Nations in order to encourage the arbitration of international com-
mercial disputes by providing a method of enforcing foreign arbitral awards. The United States
acquiesced to the Convention on July 31, 1970, to become effective December 29, 1970. See 9
U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1976). The advantages of the Convention over prior treaties were summa-
rized by the president of the 1958 U.N. conference as follows: 1) it reduces and simplifies re-
quirements for the party seeking recognition or enforcement of an award; 2) the burden of proof
is placed on the party opposing recognition or enforcement of an award; 3) the parties have
greater control of choice of law and procedure; and 4) it gives the right to the authority consid-
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cluded that it provided no guidance.33
The court then turned its attention to Uranex' argument that the
holding of the Third Circuit in McCreary Tire and Rubber Co. v. CEA T
Sp.A. should be followed.3 4 McCreary, a Pennsylvania corporation, en-
tered an exclusive distributorship contract with an Italian corporation,
CEAT. The contract provided that all disputes would be arbitrated in
Brussels, Belgium. 3 5 However, when a dispute arose, McCreary initiated
suit in Pennsylvania by attaching property of CEAT located within that
state. The litigation was removed to federal court where defendant's mo-
tions to stay the lawsuit pending arbitration and to dissolve the attach-
ment were denied.3 6
CEAT appealed to the Third Circuit, which held that it had juris-
diction to review the denial of the stay but lacked jurisdiction to review
the denial of the motion for dissolution of the attachment.3 7 Despite its
finding, the court decided to review both denials because they were in-
corporated into the same order.3 8 The court held that the Convention
clearly mandated a stay of the lawsuit pending arbitration.3 9 In addi-
tion, it analyzed the attachment as analogous to the lawsuit itself. It
found the motion for attachment to be "a violation of McCreary's agree-
ment to submit the underlying disputes to arbitration. ' 40 Attachment
was characterized as a bypass of the arbitration agreement which forced
a party into court in violation of his contract and in contravention of the
purposes of the Convention. 4' The court did not address the policy rea-
sons which have traditionally supported prejudgment attachment, such
as providing the plaintiff with security for any future award, but stated
only that attachment might be available to enforce an award.42
A subsequent district court case, Metropolitan World Tanker, Corp. v.
PN. Pertambangan Minjfrkdangas Bumi Nastonal,4 3 followed the reasoning of
McCreag. The Metropolitan court rejected the plaintiff's claim that the
Convention embraced the procedures applicable to domestic arbitration
disputes. 44 It noted that case law allowed a plaintiff to proceed by at-
tachment under the United States Arbitration Act4 5 if the applicable law
ering the recognition or enforcement to order the opposing party to supply suitable security.
Quigley, Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards, 58 A.B.A.J. 821 (1972).
33 451 F. Supp. at 1052.
34 Id. at 1050.
35 501 F.2d at 1033.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 1037.
38 The court in CP&L stated that the McCreaqy court ruled on the attachment despite its
lack of jurisdiction.
39 501 F.2d at 1038.
40 Id. at 1033.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 427 F. Supp. 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
44 Id. at 4.
45 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976). See U.S.C. § 8 (1976) (pertaining to proceedings in admiralty).
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otherwise contained an attachment provision. 4 6 However, as in Mc-
Crear, the court interpreted the silence of the Convention as an implica-
tion that attachment was not authorized. 4 7 Furthermore, the court
elaborated on the policy objectives apparently underlying the McCreag
opinion. It stated,
[t]he very purpose behind the Convention is to bring about settlement of
disputes solely through arbitration proceedings, and to allow a resort to
attachment before [arbitration] would seem to put an unnecessary and
counterproductive pressure on a situation which could otherwise be set-
tled expeditiously and knowledgeably in an arbitration context.
48
This rationale was flatly rejected in CP&L.49 The court attacked
the McCreary court's analysis of the distinctions between the Act and the
Convention. 50 It rejected the finding that the Convention negated the
court's jurisdiction by requiring "referral" of the case to arbitration while
the Act permitted continued jurisdiction since only a "stay" of the action
pending arbitration was mandated. This distinction between the terms
"stay" and "referral" was found to be a purely semantic rather than a
substantive difference, attributable to the Convention's applicability to
many different legal systems where the technical term "stay" might be
meaningless.5 1
The CI&L court noted that the Act, which functions like the Con-
vention for domestic agreements involving maritime or interstate com-
merce, contained no provision prohibiting prejudgment attachment
pending arbitration.5 2 Under section 8 of the Act, prejudgment attach-
ment had been granted in a case involving maritime law, The Anaconda v.
Amerzcan Sugar Refmg Co. 53 The court in Anaconda reasoned that without
the attachment provisions, "an arbitral award would be wholly unen-
forceable as the vessel might seldom or never be within the jurisdiction of
our courts."
5 4
Finally, the court cited Boys Market, Inc. o. Retail Clerks55 and stated
that "in other contexts the Supreme Court has concluded that the availa-
bility of provisional remedies encourages rather than obstructs the use of
agreements to arbitrate."' 56 However, Boys Market involved a union-com-
pany dispute governed by a collective bargaining agreement. The agree-
ment contained a clause which provided that there would be no work
stoppage, lockout, picketing or boycott for the duration of the contract. 57
46 427 F. Supp. at 4.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 451 F. Supp. at 1051.
50 Id. at 1052.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 1052.
53 322 U.S. 42 (1943).
54 Id. at 46.
55 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
56 451 F. Supp. at 1052.
57 398 U.S. at 235.
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Subsequently, the union members struck and engaged in picketing and
the company sought injunctive relief. In granting the injunction, the
Supreme Court recognized the congressional policy encouraging arbitra-
tion of labor disputes. Nevertheless, it found that under the circum-
stances, injunctive relief could facilitate the implementation of that
congressional policy by removing an obstacle which engendered contro-
versy and ill-will. 5a The court characterized its decision as a narrow
holding. 59 Thus, the CP&L court based its policy argument on a case in
which the Supreme Court granted an injunction to enforce a no-strike
provision in a labor contract. The court did not explain how, under the
facts in CP&L, the maintenance of the attachment order would facilitate
arbitration agreements. Unlike Boys Market, the court allowed an inter-
mediary step to occur between the occurrence of the dispute and com-
mencement of the arbitration.
The final issue addressed by the court was: Who actually owned the
attached funds?60 Uranex asserted that it had contracted with Home-
stake only as an agent or commissionaire for Compagnie General de Mater-
iele Nucleonie (COGEMA), a French corporation wholly owned by the
French government. 6 1 Since California law permits a creditor to attach
only the debtor's actual interest in property, 62 the court had to deter-
mine whether Uranex or COGEMA was the owner of the debt under
French law. CP&L advanced the theory that since the commissionaire is
personally bound by the contract with the third party (Homestake) and
the principal or commettant (COGEMA), and the third party generally
have no legal recourse against each other, the proceeds of the contract
are the property of the commissionaire while in his or the third party's
possession. 63 Alternatively, CP&L argued that the relationship between
Uranex and COGEMA was essentially a partnership, making
COGEMA liable for Uranex' debts. The court quickly dispensed with
the second theory by stating that under California law a partner cannot
be personally liable unless he is made a party to the action and
COGEMA was never made a party to the suit.
64
CP&L emphasized three points in support of its primary theory.
First, the commzssionazre contracts with third parties in his own name.
Second, payments by the third party go into the general funds of the
commissionaire. Finally, the commissionaire may pay the commetlant with as-
sets other than those received under the contract. 65 Uranex rested its
argument on inconsistencies between the proposition that the commission-
58 Id. at 253.
59 Id.
60 See generaly R. PENNINGTON, supra note 9.
61 451 F. Supp. at 1052.
62 See Kinnison v. Guaranty Liquidating Corp., 18 Cal. 2d 256, 115 P.2d 450 (1941).
63 451 F. Supp. at 1053.
64 Id. at 1054 n.6.
65 Id. at 1053.
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aire owns the commission sales proceeds and other aspects of the commissi-
onaire-commellant relationship. Most important was the fact that the com-
missionaire never holds title to the goods sold on behalf of the commet/ant.
Moreover, the commeltani may reclaim the goods in the event of the com-
missionaire's bankruptcy. Although the parties were in disagreement on
the crucial issue of the commetant's right to unpaid sales proceeds, this
point was not resolved by the court. Instead it relied on the rule that
allows the third party to offset payments to the commissionaire by any
claims the third party has against the commettant. The court held that
this rule "implied that the unpaid price is to be regarded as the property
of the commellanh."'66
The court, in determining who owned the assets, recognized a fun-
damental problem encountered in international law. It stated, "despite
the excellent briefing that has attended this litigation, it is difficult to
weigh the relative significance of these features without a broader under-
standing of the role these commission arrangements play in French com-
merce. Furthermore, important and relevant features of French law on
commission sales apparently remain unresolved. '6 7 This illustrates the
difficulty involved in applying foreign law, a difficulty sought to be
avoided by arbitration. Ultimately, the court resolved the issue by find-
ing the commt'sst'onai're analogous to the American agent. Therefore, it
held that Uranex did not own the debt due from Homestake. 68 How-
ever, the court noted that 1.5 percent of the account payable constituted
Uranex' commission on the transaction. It maintained the attachment
in the amount of $1,278,000, Uranex' interest in the fund.
By authorizing attachment of Uranex' assets, the court recognized
the state's interest in providing security for a plaintiff in the event of a
judgment in his favor. However, the court failed to consider fully the
implications of granting jurisdiction to the courts when the parties have
agreed to arbitrate. The arbitration agreement signifies the parties' in-
tent to settle their dispute privately. The holding in CP&L requires the
defendant to appear in court to litigate the issues involved in the attach-
ment proceeding. The incongruity of prejudgment attachment with the
policies favoring arbitration is illustrated by the fact that it is condi-
tioned on the filing of an in personam suit. Thus, the defendant who is
bound to arbitrate must appear to protect his property in one forum,
and, additionally, must appear to file a motion to refer the in personam
suit required by CP&L to arbitration.
Other factors compound the problem caused by the CP&L decision.
Efficiency is lost in the barrage of judicial and arbitral proceedings re-
quired to complete the attachment action. The parties' quest for conven-
ience by specifying the site of arbitration contractually is defeated by the
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 1054.
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requirement of appearing before the court to attain or attack a prejudg-
ment attachment. The relative economy of arbitration as opposed to liti-
gation is diminished as multiple actions force costs upward. The parties'
control over many aspects of dispute settlements, such as choice of forum
and choice of law, is relinquished.
Caroha Power and Light Co. v. Uranex offers an excellent illustration of
this problem. Although it contracted to arbitrate all disputes in New
York, Uranex was brought into a California court to litigate the attach-
ment issues. The court conditioned the attachment on the filing of an in
personam suit, a requirement directly contrary to the parties' intent.
Conceivably, a defendant could be brought into several courts to litigate
issues arising from attachments in different jurisdictions. This result is
clearly contrary to the purpose of the Convention. As the McCreaO, court
argued, the Convention was enacted to encourage arbitration by insur-
ing the integrity of arbitral awards. The decision in CP&L frustrates the
intent of the parties to arbitrate by allowing multiple judicial actions to
precede termination of the arbitration.
-Lou ANN NEWMAN

